



Charles Ess, Johnny Søraker & May Thorseth
Both the scholarly and certainly the popular literatures surrounding infor-
mation and computing ethics make frequent reference to one or more revo-
lutions. To be sure, in an age that has witnessed—and is increasingly driven
by—rapid technological innovation and diffusion, it is tempting to believe
that new technologies cannot help but to transform our lives and worlds in
radical, dramatic, and thus revolutionary ways.
Insofar as the trope of revolution is justified—and, more importantly,
whether the notion as applied to technological innovation is useful in the
context of information and computing ethics—it seems fair to say that the
last seventy years or so have witnessed at least three revolutions of interest
to us here, beginning with the computing revolution of the 1930s onward.
As is well known, «computers» were once the name for human beings who
undertook arithmetic and mathematical calculations, aided only by printed
reference tables, slide rules, and, by the early 20th century, mechanical cal-
culators. In simply quantitative terms, up until 1943 a human being with a
slide rule could carry out a standard mathematical operation in c.2 seconds
(0.5 operations per second or OPS). When the Marchant mechanical calcu-
lator was introduced at the Los Alamos labs in 1943 to assist with calcula-
tions required for the development of the atomic bomb, it doubled compu-
tation speed to 1 OPS. As electronic computers were introduced, the Los
Alamos FERMIAC computer delivered 10 OPS by 1947. By 2010, the Los
Alamos’ supercomputers deliver over 100 trillion OPS.1 Expressed alterna-
tively, the computational power of a 1970s’ supercomputer is now vastly
surpassed by a contemporary smartphone.2
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The second revolutionary turn began in the early 1970s, when initial
efforts were made to link computers, i.e., to allow electronic communication
between them. By 1973, Vincent Cerf and Robert E. Kahn began developing
what was later standardized as the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol (TCP/IP) that now connects millions of computers and over 26%
of the world’s population (cf. Abbate 2000: 127–133). Computer-mediated
communication (CMC) became the subject of academic study at least by
1978 with Hiltz and Turoff ’s The Network Nation (1978: see Herring 2008:
xxxv). As ARPANET and then NSFNET in the US gradually expanded and
then opened up to commercial proprietary networks (e.g., CompuServe,
Prodigy, etc.: Abbate 2000: 191–209) from the early 1990s onwards, our
world has been transformed by the radical expansion of shared networked
communication made possible by TCP/IP and what is now a generically
shared Internet and World Wide Web (cf. Ess & Consalvo, in press).
If these developments count as revolutionary, then a third revolution
would appear to be underway: the sorts of computation, applications, and
communication once the provenance of desktops and laptops are increas-
ingly accessed via Internet-enabled smart phones. Such phones are now car-
ried by the majority of populations in industrialized countries as a taken-
for-granted, increasingly essential appliance. In the developing world, as
dramatically less expensive and easier to service than a desktop or laptop,
such phones are rapidly diffusing as the portal of choice for the Internet. At
the same time, radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags and other tech-
nologies allow appliances as diverse as refrigerators and running shoes to
transfer information via the Internet—developing an expanding web of
«the internet of things».
Information and computing ethics struggle to address the specific ethi-
cal issues that these emerging technologies have evoked through the appli-
cation of these new technologies, both through applying familiar ethical
frameworks and as we are forced to grapple with challenges that seem to
leap beyond the capacities of these frameworks. Especially, if indeed these
technologies entail revolution, then it would seem that our ethical work will
face very steep—perhaps insurmountable—challenges. That is, whatever
else ‘revolution’ may imply, it would seem to suggest that much of previ-
ously established frameworks—including ethical frameworks—no longer
give us the grip and facilities required to effectively think our way through
radically new sorts of ethical dilemmas and issues.
For that, there is now a robust and extensive literature of information
ethics regarding Information and Computing Technologies (ICTs) in the
form of now «domesticated»— i.e., widely diffused and taken-for-granted
appliances—networked laptops and desktops. By comparison, however,
informed ethical reflection on mobile and ubiquitous computing is in its
early stages.
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Hence, for this special issue we invited potential contributors to develop
empirically-informed analyses and to present ethical reflections on the
diverse ethical dimensions that arise in conjunction with mobile and ubi-
quitous computing technologies. We are very pleased with the quality and
range of the contributions, both for the quality of their distinctive insights
and reflections, and for what they collectively suggest regarding larger pat-
terns in the ethics relating to these technologies, including—as we will see
in our concluding remarks below—how far we are helped or hindered in
our ethical work by the trope of revolution.
We begin with Rich Ling and Rhonda McEwen’s «Mobile communica-
tion and ethics: implications of everyday actions on social order,» in part
because Ling and McEwen introduce us to several crucial elements of
mobile phone use, as well as to ethical frameworks that are commonly used
to guide our reflections and judgments regarding their proper use.
Ling and McEwen highlight the peculiar tensions surrounding the
mobile phone: it is highly individualized and personal—but as a communi-
cation device, the mobile provides both security and a sense of being tethe-
red. These tensions thereby evoke distinctive social and ethical conflicts,
specifically regarding the question: How do I respond to what may be an
urgent SMS or phone call while in the middle of communicating and enga-
ging with co-present friends, family, acquaintances, etc.?
As we would put it, the newness of this technology puts us in a kind of
ethical twilight. On the one hand, generally shared norms and etiquette for
mobile phone use are only gradually emerging, while on the other hand a
phone call or message indication strikes with unexpected immediacy in a
wide range of social situations, requiring snap judgments as to our proper
action (i.e., whether to respond to or ignore the call or message). The good
news is that we are increasingly able to make such judgments effectively.
Using helpful traffic metaphors, Ling and McEwen observe that we often
seek to «park» in some way our local engagements in order to determine
whether or not to respond to a call or text. At the same time, however, they
state that in many cases «the co-present interaction has a type of entrenched
right of way when compared to talking on the phone.» Moreover, a central
research finding is that mobile phones work to strengthen rather than fray
our closest ties.
Litska Strikwerda’s «Information privacy, the right to receive informa-
tion and (mobile) ICTs» directly confronts the question of what informa-
tion about individuals should be made public by the press and what infor-
mation should remain private. Strikwerda approaches this question in
terms of the tension between individual rights of privacy vis-à-vis the inte-
rests and right of the larger public to receive information. Drawing extensi-
vely on both legal definitions and philosophical discussion of privacy and
information privacy, Strikwerda argues that we must balance individual
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rights to privacy vis-à-vis public interest through a principle of proportio-
nality.
The problem, of course, is that ICTs—and especially mobile ICTs—chal-
lenge this proportionality or equilibrium, as they increase both our ability
to generate and «publish» otherwise private information (e.g., physical
location) and our ability to receive such information. Strikwerda argues that
they nonetheless do not thereby change the balance needed between infor-
mation privacy and the right to receive information as a member of the
public: specifically she concludes: «We only have the right to receive infor-
mation about others through the press if the information concerned is of
public interest.» In short, for all their novelty, mobile ICTs do not appear to
render extant law and ethics irrelevant; rather, these can continue to be used
effectively to address the ethical challenges these new technologies bring in
their wake.
Svein Sando’s article «Play and virtuality» helps us explore important
similarities and contrasts between play, as classically defined and discussed
by Johan Huizinga, and virtual worlds. His central question is whether or
not, as Huizinga claims, play is ethically neutral. For example, those who
seek to defend the presence of explicit sex and violence in videogames from
critics who worry about their potentially negative consequences sometimes
resort to the claim «It’s just a game»—meaning, in part, that the events
depicted and played out in the game are ethically neutral. After reviewing
and taking on board the analyses and arguments of several significant figu-
res on play and virtuality, Sando uses the (in)famous example of a «rape in
cyberspace» (Dibbell 1993) to argue that at least at points, play can, contra
Huizinga, become evil. This claim is especially important insofar as mobile
devices increasingly make ubiquitous in our lives the possibility of engaging
in such computer-mediated play. In Sando’s view, this ubiquity does not
thereby somehow dilute the ethical dimensions or responsibility of our
world—as it would if Huizinga were right. On the contrary, while these
technologies may bring more opportunities for play into our everyday lives
such play is not always ethically neutral, but rather requires ethical reflec-
tion and responsibility alongside our other everyday activities.
Anders Albrechtslund’s «Deltagende overvågning og sociale fællesska-
ber på nettet» seeks to complement more prevailing notions of surveillance
with his careful account of participatory surveillance. Albrechtslund
reminds us of the more familiar—and far more negative—processes of sur-
veillance at work in George Orwell’s authoritarian «Big Brother» state, and
in Bentham’s conception of the panopticon, as made famous in the work of
Foucault. By contrast, Albrechtslund highlights the multiple ways in which
a kind of lateral and voluntary surveillance—«keeping an eye on one
another»—is essential to human community and often experienced as a
positive dimension of that community. Albrechtslund argues that this form
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of participatory surveillance helps us better understand the sorts of infor-
mation sharing that we observe on social networking sites and other online
communities. Specifically, what from an Orwellian or Foucauldian perspec-
tive would seem to be risky abandonment of privacy—e.g., various sorts of
intimate thoughts and events now shared easily and frequently within at
least small groups on a social networking site such as Facebook—can rather
be understood as the sort of bid for and acceptance of intimacy and support
that we seek and endorse in human communities familiar to us from offline
experiences.
Elin Palm’s «Informations och kommunikationstekniska lösningar i
vård och omsorg  för vem och varför?» turns our focus to another expres-
sion of ubiquitous and mobile computing, namely the use of ICTs and rela-
ted technologies designed to provide specific kinds of care for the elderly.
On the one hand, these technologies may help address the otherwise
crushing problems of attempting to deliver quality health care to a rapidly
growing elderly population in the developed countries. On the other hand,
these technologies bring in their wake familiar ethical challenges. Palm
focuses on three of these: personal integrity, freedom, and informed con-
sent. Broadly, she argues that whatever the other pressures may be for intro-
ducing such technological solutions to meet pressing needs in healthcare,
we can only do so by insuring that these basic ethical requirements and
demands are recognized and protected.
Cornelius Cappelen’s «Fair unemployment compensation and the tar-
get for egalitarian concerns,» along with Kristian Bjørkdahl’s book review
«Du er ikke en dings!» belong to the open section of this special issue, and
as such they are not directly related to the remaining contributions.
However, as we shall see, there are some interesting connections between
Cappelen’s paper and the core issues of this volume. To begin with, in
discussing fair unemployment compensation, Cappelen brings to the fore
an interesting discussion about the possible relevance of the difference bet-
ween income losses and welfare losses when discussing compensation for
the unemployed. A core question is in what respect people could be made
more equal, and whether factors that we can be responsible for should be
considered morally different from those that we cannot be held responsible
for. By introducing some illuminating examples discussed by Dworkin and
Cohen, the author undertakes a fine-grained analysis of this question. A
second interesting connection that can be made with several of the other
chapters—one that is specifically relevant to the discussion of ethical
dimensions of new information technologies—is the question as to whether
our lives are transformed in equalizing manners by way of access to and use
of ICTs. Thereby, new technology can perhaps contribute to more equaliza-
tion between citizens in the sense discussed by Cappelen, be they employed
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or unemployed. This question is not developed in this special issue, but
would no doubt be an interesting research topic for another publication.
Concluding remarks
What is striking about the contributions taken together is that more often
than not, moral frameworks and practices already in place seem largely suf-
ficient to deal with the various ethical challenges that arise—including
some of the most novel—in conjunction with new technologies. That is, we
seem to be finding our moral footing with regard to mobile phone use (Ling
and McEwen), how we deal with information online vis-à-vis print journa-
lism and the public (Strikwerda), the ethics of play and virtual worlds
(Sando), and ubiquitous computing in the domain of health care (Palm).
Even Albrechtslund’s account of participatory surveillance reminds us that
what seem like distinctive new ways of apparently violating individual
privacy in social networking sites and other online communities may be not
so much revolutionary as they are a recovery and enhancement of ways of
being together in human community that have operated since there have
been such communities.
This is by no means to suggest that no revolution is at hand, or that
further ethical challenges will be easily resolved without considerable, per-
haps fatal, stress and strain on extant ethical frameworks. It is rather to sug-
gest that as we approach the ethical dimensions of new technologies, we use
the term ‘revolution’ with care, especially as it may misleadingly suggest that
we are faced with ethical challenges that, as resting on what may indeed
be considered genuinely revolutionary technologies and innovations, will
thereby be beyond our grasp.
We may be helped here by the larger history of communication media.
So, Asa Briggs and Peter Burke remind us with regard to the Print Revolu-
tion as first identified and documented by Elizabeth Eisenstein (drawing in
turn on the work of Marshall McLuhan and Walter Ong). To be sure, the
printing press and the diffusion of literacy indeed issued in profound social,
political, and ethical change (including, we may note here, nothing less than
the emergence of the modern democratic-liberal state and the sense of self
as a moral autonomy that both requires and justifies such a state, cf. Ess
2010): but these changes required three centuries for their development and
manifestation (i.e., from Gutenberg to Diderot’s Encyclopédie). As with the
Industrial Revolution, Briggs and Burke suggest we think of these transfor-
mations as a Long Revolution—though it remains a question as to «whether
a revolution which is not rapid can be regarded as a revolution at all»
(Briggs & Burke 2002: 22).
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Whatever the possible applicability and ethical relevance of the label
«revolution,» we are confident that the articles collected here will provide
their readers with very helpful new insights and analyses, and add substan-
tially to the still-nascent literature on the ethics of mobile computing and
ubiquitous technologies. We wish to thank our contributors very much for
their work and reflection, and to our readers—god fornøyelse!
Notes
1 See e.g., http://www.flickr.com/photos/8 399 025@N07/2 844 162 097/
2 For example, a 1970s’ mainframe might have had access to disk drives (the size
of dishwashers) that could store 50 MB of information, compared to the 2 GB
or 4 GB routinely popped into a smartphone today. In terms of processing
speed, measured in terms of floating point operations per second (flops), the first
Cray-1 supercomputer operated at 150 megaflops (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
History_of_computing_hardware_(1960s–present). A recently developed smart-
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